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BUYERS AND SELLERS OF GOODS IN BANKRUPTCY
VERN COUNTRYMANt

The title of this article is not meant to exclude great numbers of
bankruptcy cases from its purview. In the 8% of almost 200,000
cases per year which are business bankruptcies, the bankrupt is likely
to be both a buyer and a seller of goods who has not maintained a
proper balance between his purchases and his sales. And in the 92%
of the cases which are consumer bankruptcies, the bankrupt will
almost invariably be one who has too often been a buyer of goods.
The title, rather, is intended to focus upon two problems which
may arise in almost any bankruptcy case. Many claims in bankruptcy
have nothing to do with the purchase or sale of goods-there are
other ways of getting into financial difficulty. And many claims
arising out of a purchase or sale of goods may be secured claims. All
of these matters are beyond the scope of this article. I am concerned
only with two rather remarkable-even audacious- provisions of
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code designed to obtain for
unsecured buyers and sellers of goods better treatment in the bankruptcy proceedings of their opposite numbers than other unsecured
creditors will receive.
Why these two types of unsecured creditors should have been
singled out by the Code draftsmen for such favored treatment is
something of a mystery. Perhaps during the arduous course of
drafting the longest of all of the Articles of the Code the draftsmen
developed a special empathy with those who must live within its
confines. At least it may be said that they treated each class of their
subjects, in this respect, with an approximately even hand. But they
did not, in my judgment, proceed with due regard for the policies
and provisions of the federal Bankruptcy Act.
THE BUYER WHO PAYS IN ADVANCE

I turn first to the buyer who has advanced all or a part of the
purchase price for goods prior to their delivery, only to discover to
his horror thereafter that the seller is insolvent. He could have
protected himself against such an eventuality, and against any
subsequent bankruptcy proceeding of the seller, by taking a security
agreement which covered other collateral or which could be made to
reach the goods contemplated by his contract as soon as the seller
2
acquired "rights in" them' and by filing a financing statement.
tProfessor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-204(1), (3); 9-303 [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.].
2. U.C.C. § 9-302(1); see also U.C.C. § 2-502, Comment 2.
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Section 2-502 of the Code is designed for the buyer who did not take
those precautions. It was likely designed primarily for the commercial buyer who was induced to extend unsecured credit to his
seller, but its terms will reach also to the consumer buyer who purchases goods on a lay-away plan.
Under § 2-502, a buyer who does not have title to the goods 3 but
does have a "special property" in them, which he acquires by their
being identified to the contract, 4 may, on tendering any unpaid
balance of the price, "recover them from the seller if the seller
becomes insolvent' within ten days after receipt of the first
installment of their price." If this provision is read to reach only the
case where the seller is solvent at the time of receiving the first
advance on the price but becomes insolvent thereafter, and not to
reach the case where the seller was insolvent when he received the
first payment, it is not clear whether the draftsmen were whimsical
in intent or deficient in execution.
I have no doubt about the efficacy of this provision in any state
insolvency proceeding-the states may prescribe their own rules of
distribution for such proceedings within constitutional limits and I
don't suppose that this means of giving recognition to the buyer's
"special property" in his goods would be held to violate the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But since most
state insolvency proceedings take the form of either assignments for
the benefit of creditors or of receiverships, most will constitute
either the fourth or the fifth act of bankruptcy. 6 Other creditors of
the seller will then have the option to file an involuntary petition
against him by initiating a bankruptcy proceeding, 7 which will
3. "Title to goods cannot pass ... prior to their identification to the contract" U.C.C.
§ 2-401(1) and, "[u] nless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the time
and place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the physical
delivery of the goods ..
" U.C.C. § 2-401(2).
4. U.C.C. § 2-501(1).
5. "A person is 'insolvent' who either has ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary course
of business or cannot pay his debts as they become due or is insolvent within the meaning of
the federal bankruptcy law." U.C.C. § 1-201(23). Under § 1(19) of the Bankruptcy Act,
"A person shall be deemed insolvent within the provisions of this Act whenever the
aggregate of his property, exclusive of any property which he may have conveyed, transferred, concealed, removed, or permitted to be concealed or removed, with intent to
defraud, hinder, or delay his creditors, shall not at a fair valuation be sufficient in amount to
pay his debts." 11 U.S.C. § 1(19).
But a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, which accounts for more than 98% of the
bankruptcy cases, need not allege insolvency in any sense. See Bankruptcy Forms Nos. 1
and 4, 11 U.S.C. And while an involuntary petition must allege the commission of an act of
bankruptcy [see Bankruptcy Form No. 51, not all of the acts of bankruptcy defined in § 3a
of the Bankruptcy Act require allegations of insolvency in the bankruptcy sense and some
do not require allegations of insolvency in any sense. See 11 U.S.C. § 21a (1964).
6. See 11 U.S.C. § 21a(4), (5).
7. See supra note 5.
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supersede the state proceeding, 8 and will deprive the buyer of his
right to recover the goods unless § 2-502 is also operative in
bankruptcy. In my judgment a good case can be made that it is not.
I begin by conceding that if the buyer were seeking to recover
from the estate of his bankrupt seller the advances made on the
purchase price rather than to claim the undelivered goods, there is
some ancient and dubious doctrine which indicates that he is to be
treated more favorably than others who have extended credit to the
seller.
The point is made most clearly by contrasting the position of one
who is induced by fraudulent misrepresentation to advance money to
another who ends in bankruptcy. His fate is forecast by that of some
of the gullible who were induced to loan $100 for ninety days to the
enterprising Charles Ponzi by his misrepresentation that he was
trafficking in international postal coupons at a 100% profit and by
his promise to return $150 for every $100 loaned, whereas he in fact
was making no profits, "was always insolvent and became daily more
so, the more his business succeeded." 9 To keep his enterprise going
when rumors began to spread, Ponzi announced that those who did
not wish to leave their $100 loans with him until maturity could
reclaim them without interest, and some did so within four months
of his bankruptcy. When his bankruptcy trustee sued to recover the
repayments as preferential the defendants contended that they had
not received payments on antecedent debts,' 0 but were "rescinding"
their contracts for fraud and reclaiming "their own money." The
Supreme Court agreed with the trustee that there had been no
rescission at the time of repayment and-more to the point
here-even if there was, that the lenders had failed to trace their
money into Ponzi's bank accounts, to which his bankrupcy trustee
had taken title under § 70a' 1 of the Bankruptcy Act. Hence they,
like "other dupes" of Ponzi, were merely general creditors and the
payments to them were preferential.1 2 Obviously, if they had not
received the preferential pre-bankruptcy repayments, they would not
have been entitled to preferential payment from the bankrupt estate.
There are a few recorded instances of a defrauded lender or buyer
8. 11 U.S.C. § 1la(21) (1964).
9. Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 8 (1924).
10. See 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1964).
11. The bankruptcy trustee is "vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt
as of the date of the filing of the petition initiating a proceeding under this
Act,... to... property, including rights of action, which prior to the filing of the petition
he could by any means have transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold
under judicial process against him, or otherwise seized, impounded, or sequestered .... 11
U.S.C.§ ll0a(5) (1964).
12. Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 11 (1924).
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who survived this tracing hurdle. While the amount one buyer had
paid to a collecting bank on a draft for the balance of the purchase
price of goods which he had received was "lying in the bank" he
discovered that his seller did not own, but had only leased, the goods
it purported to sell and notified the bank, thus causing it not to
remit to the seller. In the seller's subsequent bankruptcy he was
allowed to rescind for fraud and to recover his traceable funds." a In
another case the defrauded lender was held to have traced his funds
by showing that the bankrupt had used them to pay an antecedent
debt and that the bankruptcy trustee had recovered the amount of
the payment as a voidable preference.'" In a third case one who
advanced money to a stockbroker for the purchase of securities
which the broker purchased and then converted was able to trace the
proceeds of the conversion to a cashier's check which he recovered
from the broker's bankruptcy trustee on a theory of constructive
trust.' ' And still another case holds that a defrauded buyer of
mineral rights can use the lowest intermediate balance test to trace
his funds into the bankrupt seller's bank accounts, but remands the
case to the bankruptcy referee for proof that the funds were ever
deposited in the accounts.' 6
In other cases the tracing requirement has proved insuperable, not
only to defrauded lenders and buyers,' ' but also to beneficiaries of a
trust where the surety on the bond of a defalcating trustee persuaded
the trustee to replace misappropriated securities with others within
four months of the trustee's bankruptcy-to the extent that the
beneficiaries were unable to trace the securities received to those
misappropriated they were held to have received preferential
transfers.' 8 And a defrauded buyer who traced his payments to their
use by the seller to pay a debt to a bank failed to recover them
because the bank acted in good faith and could not be held as a
constructive trustee.' 9
Moreover, even where a buyer or lender establishes his right to
rescind and traces his funds, if that right is by state law inferior to
13. Hirsch v. Morton, 13 F.2d 701 (3rd Cir. 1926).
14. In re Thompson, 4 F.Supp. 921 (W.D.Wash. 1933).
15. Gordon v. Spalding, 268 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1959).
16. In re Rhine, 241 F.Supp. 86 (D.Colo. 1965).
17. See In re Knetzer, 243 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied 355 U.S. 835 (1957);
In re Tate-Jones Co., 85 F.Supp. 971 (W.D.Pa. 1949), cf. Bateman v. Patterson, 212 Ga.
284, 92 S.E.2d 8 (1956).
18. Clarke v. Rogers, 228 U.S. 534 (1913).
19. Continental Grain Co. v. First National Bank, 162 F.Supp. 814 (W.D.Tenn. 1958). If
In re Thompson, 4 F.2d 701 (3rd Cir. 1926) is correct, the buyer's action here may have
been premature. The bankruptcy trustee of the seller had a preference action pending
against the bank.
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the intervening rights of levying creditors, the buyer or lender will
not prevail against the bankruptcy trustee of the seller or borrower.
By § 70c of the Bankruptcy Act 2 0 the bankruptcy trustee takes the
status of a levying creditor as of the date of filing of the bankruptcy
petition.'
In many cases one who has advanced money against the purchase
price of undelivered goods will be unable either to prove fraud or to
trace his funds. But if the 1909 decision of the Supreme Court in the
Hurley case2 2 is still the law, he need not do either. In that case a
railway company, in order to enable its coal supplier to meet its
payroll, had paid in advance for coal which was never delivered nor
even mined because of the ensuing bankruptcy of the supplier and
the expiration of its lease of the mines. The railway company was
held entitled to have its advances repaid as a preferred claim. The
explanation for this result, if there is one, lurks in the following
passages from Justice Brewer's opinion:
[The railway company] was not engaged in the business of money
lending. Its entire arrangement was for the purpose of securing daily
its needed coal, and that was fully understood by all the
parties.... The railway company was simply paying in advance
instead of waiting until the fifteenth day of the succeeding month
[following delivery-the time specified for payment in its long-term
requirements contract with the supplier], and the money by it
loaned was not loaned as an independent transaction-such as would
be made by an ordinary money lender-but an advancement made in
anticipation of the delivery of the coal. To ignore this element and
make the bankruptcy proceeding operate to discharge this obligation
of the [supplier] , and leave the transaction as one of an independent
loan of money to the coal company would result in destroying the
full equitable obligations of the coal company, and place the parties
in their relations to each other on an entirely different basis from
what had been contemplated by them when they entered into this
original arrangement ....
That the coal for which the money was advanced was not yet
mined, but remained in the ground to be mined and delivered from
day to day as required, does not change the transaction into one of
an ordinary independent loan on the credit of the [supplier] or
upon express mortgage security. It implies a purpose that the coal as
mined should be delivered, and is from an equitable standpoint to be
20. 11 U.S.C. § ll0c (1964).
21. See In re Rhine, 241 F.Supp. 86 (D.Colo. 1965) where the buyer's right to rescind
was held superior under state law to the rights of levying creditors.
22. Hurley v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 213 U.S. 126, 131-132,
134-135 (1909), [hereinafter cited as Hurley].
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considered as a pledge of the unmined coal to the extent of the
advancement. The equitable rights of the parties were not changed
by the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings. All obligations of
a legal and equitable nature remain undisturbed thereby....
It is at least doubtful, since the Bankruptcy Act prescribes its own
system of priorities in § 64a,2' that this decision should be taken as
prescribing a first priority for all claimants who, like wage earners
entitled to a limited second priority under the Act, are "not engaged
in the business of money lending" or who, like tort claimants who
are entitled to no priority under the Act, can be distinguished from
an "ordinary money lender."
Insofar as Justice Brewer's rhetoric smacks of the concept of the
"equitable lien" there are other problems. It was not assumed that
the "pledge of the unmined coal" survived the return of that coal to
the supplier's lessor on termination of the lease. And, while it is not
uncommon for a bankruptcy trustee to exercise a bankrupt's right to
redeem encumbered property where there is an equity which will
enhance the estate, 2 4 there is no apparent reason why he should pay
off a debt which no longer encumbers property which is not a part of
the estate.
Moreover, even if the property remained in the seller's bankrupt
estate, it is no longer true that "equitable rights," including liens,
remain undisturbed by the bankruptcy proceeding. Whether they do
depends upon their status as against third parties. As enacted in 1910
2
and since frequently amended, § 70c of the Bankruptcy Act s gives
the trustee the status, as of the date of the bankruptcy petition, of a
creditor who had levied on the property. Hence, it would be
necessary today to inquire into the applicable state law about the
relative rights of levying creditors and the supplier with the
"equitable pledge," and if levying creditors would prevail so would
the bankruptcy trustee. 2 6 Indeed, at least two cases decided since
"equitable liens" have gone out of fashion under the Bankruptcy Act
reject the claim of a buyer that he was entitled to a return of
23. 11 U.S.C. 104a (1964).
24. See 4 A. Collier, Bankruptcy

70.16[31, 70.18[101, 70.21, 70.991 (14th rev. ed.

1967).
25. 11 U.S.C. § 110c (1964).
26. Since the Hurley case involved unmined coal, it could not be disposed of today even
on a finding that the supplier's "equitable pledge" was valid against levying creditors. If it
was not valid against a bona fide purchaser it would, under § 60a(2) of the Act, [ 11 U.S.C.
§ 96a(2) (1964)] be deemed to have arisen immediately before the filing of the bankruptcy
petition, which would convert it into a transfer on account of antecedent debt vulnerable to
attack as a perference. There are also some possibilities for invoking the bona fide purchaser
test against "equitable liens" on personalty under § 60a(6) [11 U.S.C. § 96a(6) (1964)],

but they are largely unrealized. See Porter v. Searle, 228 F.2d 748 (10th Cir. 1955).
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advances paid on the purchase price by virtue of an "equitable lien"
on goods which did remain in the bankrupt estate, though they do so
without reference either to § 70c or to the earlier Supreme Court
decision.' '
Perhaps because of doubts about the present viability of ancient
doctrine, § 2-502 of the Code does not in terms give the seller a right
to the return of advances made on the purchase price-though it may
give him the leverage to obtain it. Instead, it entitles him to claim
goods identified to the contract on tender of any unpaid balance of
the price. This the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held a seller without title could not do prior to the Code even
though he had paid the full purchase price in advance. 2 8 True, the
court based its decision on a conclusion that title had not passed
because the contract had been for the sale of unascertained or future
goods which had not been "appropriated to the contract" at the time
of bankruptcy, and because under a provision of the old Uniform
Sales Act 2 "[u] nless a different intention appears" title would not
pass until the goods were appropriated to the contract. True, also,
what was an "appropriation" of goods to a contract, which under
this provision of the Sales Act would give the buyer title, is doubtless
an "identification" of the goods to the contract which under the
Code will give the buyer a "special property" in the goods. 3 0 True,
finally, it is only the buyer with such a "special property" who under
§ 2-502 is allowed to recover the goods from an insolvent seller.
But under the Sales Act the right of a buyer of goods with title to
recover the goods from the seller was not dependent on the solvency
or insolvency of the seller. Under § 41 of that Act it was the "duty
of the seller to deliver the goods, and of the buyer to accept and pay
for them, in accordance with the terms of the contract." And if the
seller "wrongfully" failed to deliver them after title had passed to the
buyer, § 66 authorized the buyer to "maintain any action allowed
by law to the owner of goods of similar kind when wrongfully converted or withheld." A contract could be written so as not to entitle
the buyer to possession and hence to bar a replevin action, even after
title had passed and the full price had been paid. But normally the
buyer with title who had paid or who tendered the full price pur27. Quittner v. Los Angeles Steel Casting Co., 202 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1953); Ely &
Walker Dry Goods Co. v. Adams Mfg. Co., 105 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1939). See also Gage
Lumber Co. v. M'Eldowney, 207 Fed. 255 (6th Cir. 1913), applying the "equitable lien"
theory of Hurley in a case where the goods remained in the seller's bankrupt estate, but
pointing out that the case arose before the 1910 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act.
28. Ely & Walker Dry Goods Co. v. Adams Mfg. Co. 105 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1939).
29. Uniform Sales Act § 19, Rule 4(1).
30. U.C.C. § 2-501(1)(b).
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suant to the terms of the contract could replevy the goods.3 1 And
where the buyer had this right at the bankruptcy of the seller he did
not lose it to the bankruptcy trustee, who under § 70a of the Bankruptcy Act 3 2 took no better claim to the goods than the seller
had. 3 3 But the buyer's right to the goods, whether or not the seller
was bankrupt, was a matter to be determined by the contract and
not by the financial condition of the seller at some later time.
But the buyer of goods under the Code, who acquires a "special
property" in circumstances where the buyer under the Sales Act
acquired title, does not have the same right to obtain the goods from
a solvent seller. Under § 2-301 the "obligation of the seller is to
transfer and deliver and that of the buyer is to accept and pay in
accordance with the contract." But even though the goods are identified to the contract and the full price has been paid, the buyer can
under § 2-716 obtain a decree of specific performance only "where
the goods are unique or in other proper circumstances" or can
replevy the goods only if he cannot obtain substitute goods on the
market. Hence, in most cases § 2-502 confers on the buyer, in the
event of the seller's insolvency, a right to obtain the goods which he
would not have if the seller remained solvent.
This is the crucial difference between the Sales Act and the Code,
as far as bankruptcy cases are concerned. It is not merely a matter of
labels-it is not that the Code denominates as "special property"
much that under the Sales Act would be called "title." The Code
draftsmen rightly deplore the prior tendency to substitute the "title"
label for analysis of substantive rights in both bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy cases, in cases involving sales and in cases involving
security interests.3 ' And their strictures have been duly heeded by at
31. 3 S. Williston, Sales § 594 (rev. ed. 1948).
32. See supra note 11. The trustee, of course, is not confined in all instances to asserting
the bankrupt's title. He may, for instance, under § 70e, 11 U.S.C. § ll0e (1964), avoid any
transfer which, "under any Federal or state law applicable thereto, is fraudulent as against
or voidable for any other reason by" a creditor having a claim provable in the bankruptcy
proceeding. Under both § 26 of the Sales Act and § 2-402(2) of the Code, where the seller
is left in possession of the goods his creditors may treat the sale as void if it is "fraudulent
under any [other] rule of law," although § 2-402(2) of the Code modifies the "other rule
of law" to the extent of providing that retention of possession by a merchant seller in good
faith and current course of trade "for a commercially reasonable time... is not
fraudulent." Hence, the trustee may under § 70e invoke the fraudulent conveyance law of
some states to avoid the sale simply because the bankrupt seller was left in possession of the
goods. See In re Enterprise Foundry Co., 37 F.Supp. 745 (E.D. Iln. 1941). Section 2-402(1)
of the Code expressly subjects even the buyer's right to recover goods from an insolvent
seller under § 2-502 to this possibility. See Note, The Uniform Commercial Code and an
Insolvent Seller's Possession of Goods Sold, 104 U.Pa. L. Rev. 96, 94-100 (1955).
33. In re Armour Ash Can Mfg. Co., 29 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1928); In re Union Hill
Preserving Co., 1 F.2d 415 (W.D.N.Y. 1924).
34. U.C.C. § § 2-401, Comment 1; 9-202, Comment; 9-507, Comment 1.
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least one court dealing with security interests in a bankruptcy proceeding.'
The point is that the Code prescribes one rule for the case
where the seller becomes insolvent and another for the case where he
does not.
In so doing the draftsmen of the Code manifest a misunderstanding of the Bankruptcy Act which they also demonstrate elsewhere,
and which I have criticized elsewhere.' 6 In many instances the
Bankruptcy Act does incorporate state law. When § 70a vests the
trustee with the bankrupt's title to his property,3 7 the courts must
necessarily look to other law, usually state law, to determine what
title the bankrupt had. While § 63a prescribes what claims are
provable in bankruptcy proceedings, 3 the validity and amount of
those claims is determined by non-bankruptcy law, usually state law.
When § 70e authorizes the trustee to avoid any transfer voidable
"under any Federal or State law applicable thereto" by a creditor
with a provable claim,3 9 the incorporation of state law is explicit.
When various provisions in § § 3b, 60a(2) and 67d(5)4 0 provide that
transfers shall date from the time when they are perfected against
bona fide purchasers or levying creditors, the courts must again look
elsewhere, and most often to state law, for filing, recording and other
notoriety requirements. But this does not mean that Congress has in
the Bankruptcy Act authorized the states to fashion two sets of rules
on title, contract, tort, avoidance and perfection-one to apply in
bankruptcy and one to apply elsewhere. No such license has been
given to the states to determine the content of the federal bankruptcy law. A fortiori, where Congress has prescribed its own rule for
a bankruptcy case-and has made its intent unmistakably clear by
rejecting a prior practice of incorporating state rules-no room is left
for the states to substitute their own rules by the manipulation of
labels.
When a state statute, like § 2-502 of the Code, confers a right to
recover goods on a buyer which is only operative in the event of the
seller's insolvency, that statute takes on the appearance of a rule for
distribution in liquidation proceedings-in other words a priority
statute. Prior to 1938, § 64 of the Bankruptcy Act prescribed certain priorities to be observed in bankruptcy, beginning with expenses
of administration and ending with a priority for "debts owing to any
person who by the laws of the States or the United States is entitled
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See In re Yale Express System, Inc., 370 F.2d 433, 384 F.2d 990 (2d. Cir. 1963).
Countryman, Code Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 75 Com. L.J. 269 (1970).
See supra note 11.
11 U.S.C. § 103a (1964).
11 U.S.C. § 11Oe (1964).
11 U.S.C. § § 21b, 96a(2), 107d(5) (1964).
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But Congress in 1938, by the Chandler Act's amendments to § 64, very deliberately abandoned this general recognition
of state priority laws and rewrote the last priority to cover the claims
of a creditor "who by the laws of the United States is entitled to
priority, and rent owing to a landlord who is entitled to priority by
to priority." 4

1

By that amendment, "All state
. "42
applicable State law ...
priorities have been deleted except in the case of a landlord. ...
"'4

And in 1966 Congress added a new § 67c(1)(A) to invalidate in
bankruptcy proceedings "every tatutory lien which first becomes
effective upon the insolvency of the debtor, ' 4 4 with this explanation:
[The new provision] strikes at liens which merely determine the
order of distribution upon insolvency or liquidation. This kind of
lien is not a specific property right which may be asserted independently of a general distribution and regardless
4 of the transfer
of the property. This is clearly a disguised priority.
True, the Code does not label the right of the buyer to recover the
goods upon the seller's insolvency either a "priority" or a "lien"-it
is an attribute of the buyer's "special property" in the goods. But the
label should not be decisive. A court could with reason conclude
that, since the statutory recovery right serves essentially the same
function as a statutory lien 4 6 it must fall under § 67c(l)(A), or,
alternatively, must fall as in conflict with the order of priorities now
specified in § 64.4 7 Indeed, several courts concluded before the
enactment of § 67c(1)(A) that various state statutory creations were
for conflict with § 64, whether labeled a
invalid in 4 bankruptcy
",priority", ' a "lien ' 4 9 or a "trust."' 0
41. As originally enacted, the quoted language described a fifth priority. 30 Stat. 563
(1898). After 1926 amendments which inserted intervening priorities, it described a seventh
priority. 44 Stat. 1921 (1926).
42. 11 U.S.C. § 104a(5) (1964).
43. H.R. Rep. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1937).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 107c(1)(A) (1964).
45. H.R. Rep. No. 686, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1965), S. Rep. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7 (1966).
46. Indeed, the statutory recovery right might be characterized as a "super lien." If the
buyer has paid the full price or tenders any unpaid portion he is entitled to the goods
regardless of their value. The usual statutory lienor is entitled only to so much of the
property subject to his lien as is necessary to satisfy his claim.
47. The Code itself reveals one instance of recognition that a state legislature cannot
prescribe the order of distribution in a federal liquidation proceeding. Section 4-214 gives
the owner of an item in the bank collection process a "preferred claim" in the liquidation of
a collecting or payor bank. But Comment 3 to that section recognizes that it cannot apply
to national banks without "amendment of the National Bank Act."
48. In re Crosstown Motors, Inc., 272 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1959), cert denied, 363 U.S.
811 (1960).
49. N.W. Day Supply Co. v. Valenti, 343 F.2d 756 (lst Cir. 1965).
50. Elliott v. Bumb, 356 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 829 (1966).
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One of those cases, which seems to me right in principle but wrong
in application, illustrates the vulnerability of the buyer's statutory
right to recover the goods under § 2-502. In re Crosstown Motors,
Inc.,' ' involved the effect to be given in bankruptcy to § 10 of the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act. That section, in brief, provided that a
party with a perfected security interest in collateral and traceable
proceeds should be entitled also to a "priority" in payment out of all
assets of the debtor in an amount equal to nontraceable proceeds
collected by the debtor within ten days of an insolvency proceeding
of the debtor or within ten days of the secured party's demand on
the debtor for an accounting, and that he should be so entitled as
against general creditors, levying creditors, encumbrancers and bona
fide purchasers other than buyers in ordinary course of trade. The
court concluded that, since the UTRA was promulgated in 1933
when the Bankruptcy Act recognized state priorities,' 2 its draftsmen
must have used the word "priority" advisedly "to give to the
[secured party] a priority ahead of general creditors upon insolvency
of the [debtor]. Nothing more was necessary. Nothing more was
contemplated.... [T] he reason for the absence of the word 'lien'
and the use of the word 'priority' is pellucid." Hence, the draftsmen
should be taken at their word and § 10 was merely a priority statute
which, after 1938, was ineffective in bankruptcy.
But UTRA § 10, it seems to me as it did to the only court
to rule upon the point,' 3 was more than a priority statute. It did not
operate solely to prescribe the order of distribution in insolvency
proceedings. By making a demand upon the debtor for an accounting
at any time the secured party could establish his entitlement to be
paid ahead of general creditors, levying creditors, encumbrancers and
bona fide purchasers other than buyers in ordinary course, whether
or not the debtor ended in an insolvency proceeding. It was, therefore, "practically and legally indistinguishable for a technical lien,"
"enforceable as such independently of an insolvency or bankruptcy
proceeding" and arising upon the secured party's demand for an
accounting without "making the insolvency of the [debtor] a condition precedent to the rights conferred." ' '
The "priority" label
should no more be conclusive than the "lien" label in determining
whether there is a conflict with § 64 of the Bankruptcy Act. And,
for the same reasons, an interest like the UTRA § 10 interest should
not be viewed as a lien which "first becomes effective on insolvency"
51. In re Crosstown Motors, Inc., 272 F.2d 226-227 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363
U.S. 811 (1960).
52. See text at notes 41-43, supra.
53. In re Harpeth Motors, 135 F.Supp. 863 (M.D.Tenn. 1955).
54. In re Harpeth Motors, 135 F.Supp. 863, 868 (M.D.Tenn. 1955).
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within the meaning of § 67c(l)(A). It is a right "which may be
asserted independently of a general distribution and regardless of the
transfer of the property." 5 '
As much cannot be said of the buyer's right to recover the goods
under § 2-502. It arises only on the insolvency of the seller. Section
2-402(1) provides that rights of "unsecured creditors of the seller
with respect to goods" are subject to the buyer's rights, but the term
"unsecured creditor" is not defined in Article 2 or elsewhere. The
term may be intended only to exclude a creditor secured by a contractual security interest, who is a "purchaser" throughout the
Code" 6 and a "secured party" under Article 9.' ' Or the term may
be taken to exclude levying creditors also. If the former interpretation is correct and the rights of a levying creditor are subject to
the buyer's rights under § 2-502, then the buyer's rights,, like the
rights of a secured party under UTRA § 10, have significance independent of an insolvency proceeding and § 2-502 does not appear
to function merely as a priority statute. This interpretation gets some
support from the language of § 2-402(1)-creditors of the seller
without a contractual security interest would have no specific rights
"with respect to goods" until they levied upon them.
But there is other evidence in he Code that when the draftsmen
intended to describe a levying creditor they did not use the term
"unsecured creditor." In Article 9, the levying creditor is defined as a
"lien creditor." ' 8 Under Article 6 a bulk sale made without compliance with that Article is ineffective against any "creditor" ' 9 and6 a
fugitive comment indicates that a levying creditor is contemplated. 0
And the "creditor" of the seller who under § 2-402(2),may treat his
retention of possession of goods as fraudulent under some other "rule
of law" is typically a creditor who invokes the doctrine of fraudulent
conveyance by levying on the goods or by filing a creditor's bill or
initiating a supplemental proceeding which gives him a judicial lien
on the goods. 6 1 Hence, it is at least arguable that § 2-402(1) says no
more than that the buyer's right to recover the goods under § 2-502
is superior to the rights of non-levying creditors who have no contractual security interest. If that is the interpretation, then under the
obvious negative inference the buyer's recovery right is subject to the
rights of levying creditors and the bankruptcy trustee of the seller
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See text at note 45, supra.
U.C.C. § 1-201(32), (33).
U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(i).
U.C.C. § 9-301(3).
U.C.C. § 6-105; see also U.C.C. § 6-109.
U.C.C. § 6-104, Comment 2;see also U.C.C. § 6-111.
See supra note 32.
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can abandon his arguments under § 64 and § 67c(l)(A) and retain
the goods under § 70c.
If the buyer had effected recovery of the goods before bankruptcy, however, the trustee would have to invalidate his recovery
right under § 64 or § 67c(l)(A)-or under an alternative attack
under § 70e suggested below-and then attack the actual recovery as
a preferential transfer under § 60. But in that event it should not be
too difficult for the trustee to prove that the seller was insolvent and
that the buyer had reasonable cause to believe the seller insolvent at
the time the buyer took the goods.
No matter how the term "unsecured creditor" in § 2-402(1) is
interpreted, its provision that the rights of unsecured creditors are
subject to the buyer's recovery rights carries another obvious nega
tive inference that the rights of bona fide purchasers from the seller
are not subject to the buyer's rights. At least such an inference seems
obvious in the absence of any other pertinent provision about the
rights of such purchasers. The only other provision which seems to
approach the rights of purchasers from the seller other than buyers in
ordinary course of business6 2 is § 2-403(1), which provides that "A
person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good
faith purchaser for value." The Code does not provide a definition of
"voidable title." But § 2-502 applies to a situation where the seller
still has title to the goods and gives the buyer the right to recover
them only if the seller becomes insolvent within ten days after receipt of the first payment on their price. It does not seem inappropriate to describe the seller's title in these circumstances as
"voidable." Nor does it seem inconsistent with the non-exclusive
listing of other instances of voidable title in § 2-403(1)-a title
acquired by a buyer by deceiving a seller as to the identity of the
purchaser, by giving a check on delivery of the goods which is later
dishonored,6 3 by otherwise entitling the seller to avoid "cash sale"
terms, or by delivery obtained through fraud punishable as larcenous
under the criminal law. Apparently, then, the original buyer's right
to recover goods under § 2-502 can be defeated by a good faith
purchaser from the seller.
62. If the seller is a merchant dealing in goods of the kind sold, the original buyer's right
to recover the goods is clearly subject to the rights of a subsequent buyer from the seller in
ordinary course of business under U.C.C. § 2-403(2) and (3).
63. Payment by check is conditional and is defeated if the check is dishonored. U.C.C.
§ 2-511(3). When payment is due and demanded on delivery, the buyer's right to retain the
goods is conditional on his making payment. U.C.C. § 2-507(2). Hence, when a check taken
for the price in a cash sale transaction is dishonored the seller is entitled to recover the
goods from the buyer or his bankruptcy trustee. In re Mort Co., 208 F.Supp. 309 (E.D.Pa.
1962); cf In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F.Supp. 840 (W.D.Va. 1968).
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It is thus apparent that the buyer's right to recovery under
§ 2-502 is in some danger under either § 64 or § 67c(l)(A). It arises
only on insolvency of the seller. Arguably, it will not prevail over
either a levying creditor of or a bona fide purchaser from the seller.
It sounds very much like a device "which merely determines the
order of distribution upon insolvency" and which is not "a specific
property right which may be asserted independently of a general
distribution and regardless of the transfer of the property." ' '

But even if the buyer survives these § 64 and § 67c(1)(A)
hurdles-perhaps because a court reads § 2-402(1) to mean that the
"unsecured creditor" who is subject to his recovery right includes a
levying creditor-he may still lose if I am correct in reading
§ 2-403(1) as meaning that the seller has a voidable title and can pass
good title to a bona fide purchaser. As previously indicated, 6 ' and as
explicitly recognized in Comment 1 to § 2-403, "purchaser"
includes a creditor with a contractual security interest. But under the
Bankruptcy Act such a creditor if his claim is otherwise provable, 6as
all but some tort claims are1 6 6 is a creditor with a provable claim,
although he must credit the value of his security on his claim and will
receive dividends only on the unpaid balance. 6 8 And under § 70e of
the Act 6 9 the trustee can avoid any "transfer" 7 0 which is voidable
by "any creditor ... having a claim provable under this Act."
64. See text at note 45, supra. Professor Frank Kennedy, writing before § 67c(1)(A) was
enacted, concluded that, "It comports better with the apparent intent of the draftsmen of
the Code, however, to regard § 2-502 as creating a perfected security interest in the buyer"
without the necessity for creation and perfection pursuant to Article 9. Kennedy, The
Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Problems Suggested by
Articles 2 and 9, 14 Rutgers L. Rev. 518, 557 (1960). I have difficulty with this analysis on
two points. First, the Comment to § 9-113 indicates that when the draftsmen of the Code
intended an interest arising under Article 2 to be treated as an Article 9 security interest
they called it a "security interest," as in § § 2-401(1), 2-505(1) and 2-711(3). Second, even
if the buyer's recovery right could be viewed as an Article 9 security interest, it would not
be a perfected security interest without filing, under § 9-113(b), because the seller has
possession of the goods. See also U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(f).
But even if it could be said that § 2-502 somehow confers upon the buyer a perfected
security interest, that conclusion does not seem to me to affect what I have concluded
about the vulnerability of the buyer's interest under § § 64 or 67c(1)(A), nor what I have to
say below about its vulnerability under § 70e and § 70b.
65. See U.C.C. § 1-201(32), (33).
66. 11 U.S.C. § 103a (1964).
67. Section 57a of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 93a (1964), provides that a proof of
claim shall set forth "whether any and, if so, what securities are held therefor...
68. 11 U.S.C. § 93h (1964).
69. 11 U.S.C. § 110e (1964).
70. As defined in U.S.C. § 1(30), "transfer" includes "the sale and every other and
different mode, direct or indirect, of disposing of or of parting with property or with an
interest therein or with the possession thereof or of fixing a lien upon property or upon an
interest therein, absolutely or conditionally, voluntarily or involuntarily, by or without
judicial proceedings..." 11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1964). In recognition of the fact that an
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Professor Stefan Riesenfeld and I, being literal-minded fellows,
suggested some time ago that if a bankruptcy trustee could locate a
secured creditor with a provable claim who could avoid a transfer the
trustee could avoid it also under § 70e, although we had no cases to
support our interpretation.7
And, under the rule of Moore v.
Bay, 7 2 he could avoid the transfer entirely even though the property
involved exceeded in value the amount of the secured claim. Professor Frank Kennedy subsequently took us both to task with a
reasoned argument that, as applied here, would say the preferable
interpretation is that the trustee cannot so use § 70e, that he can
invoke the rights of the secured creditor only when he can avoid that
creditor's security interest, and then he can invoke the rights of the
secured creditor only by being subrogated-and confined to the
amount of-his claim.7" Shortly thereafter the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, apparently without the benefit of
any of our learned views, held that the trustee under § 70e and
Moore v. Bay could invalidate an unrecorded assignment of accounts
receivable by invoking the rights, alternatively, of a subsequent
assignee, a subsequent levying creditor, or the United States with a
subsequently arising statutory tax lien. 7 4 In a later case the same
interest in property conferred by statute constitutes a "transfer" under this definition,
§ 67b [11 U.S.C. 107b (1964)] exempts certain statutory liens from attack as preferential
transfers under § 60.
71. Riesenfeld, Book Review, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 1854, 1857 (1966); Countryman, Cases
and Materials on Debtor and Creditor 489 (1964).
72. Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
73. Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy as a Secured Creditor Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 1419 (1967). I would agree with Professor Kennedy
insofar as he argues that the trustee should not be able to use § 70e and the doctrine of
Moore v. Bay to defeat a diligently perfected security interest under the Code merely
because another creditor with a provable claim also has a perfected security interest which,
under the Code, unavoidably has priority over the security interest attacked. But I would
argue to the contrary where the security interest attacked is vulnerable to any other sort of
a secured claim because its holder never perfected or did not perfect as soon as he might
have. Professor Kennedy's chief concern seems to arise from the fact that the Code uses the
term "priority" in § 9-312 to describe the superior position of a security interest against
whom it was impossible for the security interest under attack to prevail no matter how
diligently perfected, and uses the same term in § 9-301 and § 9-312 to describe the position
of those who prevail over the security interest under attack because of delay in perfection or
because of nonperfection. Earlier filing and recording acts which § 9-301 and parts of
§ 9-312 replace usually spoke of the unperfected interest or the interest whose perfection
was delayed as "void," "voidable" or "fraudulent" against intervening interests and that is
the language used in § 70e of the Bankruptcy Act [11 U.S.C. § 110e]. That being so, it
does not seem to me too much of a wrench of the language of § 70e to confime the trustee's
avoiding power under that section to those instances where another secured creditor with a
provable claim has obtained a "priority" under § 9-301 or § 9-312 because the secured
creditor under attack either did not perfect at all or did not perfect diligently. Section 70e
need not be read to require the impossible.
74. Abramson v. Boedeker, 379 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1006
(1967).
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court also permitted the trustee to invoke the rights of a landlord
with a lien for rent. 7" In neither case did the court make any inquiry

into the trustee's ability to invalidate the interests of the creditors
whose avoiding powers he invoked.
That is certainly enough to give the bankruptcy trustee of the
seller an arguable case when a buyer seeks to recover goods under
§ 2-502 and when the trustee is able, as he frequently will be, to
locate another creditor with an intervening Code security interest.
Indeed, with the Code's launching of the "floating lien" which will
scoop up all after-acquired property of the debtor, such an interis almost inevitable if the seller was engaged in
vening creditor
7
business. 6
Should the buyer somehow survive this hurdle also, he still would
not be in the clear if he had not advanced the full purchase price
before the seller's bankruptcy. Under § 70b of the Bankruptcy
the seller's bankruptcy trustee has the option to assume or
Act,7
reject "executory" contracts, and if he rejects the other contracting
party is left with an unsecured claim for damages.7 8 It seems to me

that those decisions are correct which hold that a contract fully
performed by the other contracting party is not an "executory"

contract within the meaning of § 70b 7 9 -otherwise every secured
claim on which the creditor has extended all of the agreed credit
before bankruptcy would be an executory contract which the trustee
could convert into an unsecured claim by rejection.' 0 Hence, the
buyer who has advanced the full contract price prior to the bank75. Electric Constructors, Inc., v. Azar, 405 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1968).
76. See Countryman, note 36, supra; see also In re Hayward Woolen Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep.
1107 (Ref.D.Mass. 1967), discussed in note 119, infra, where such a creditor was held to
qualify as a "purchaser" under § 2-403(1).
77. 11 U.S.C. § ll0b (1964).
78. 11 U.S.C. § 103c (1964).
79. Stell Manufacturing Co. v. Gilbert, 372 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1967); In re Forney, 299
F.2d 503 (7th Cir. 1962). See also In re San Francisco Bay Exposition, 50 F.Supp. 344
(N.D.Cal. 1943).
80. 1 am aware that it is the practice of some bankruptcy referrees to "reject" secured
claims. But they also surrender the collateral to the secured creditor, leaving him to prove an
unsecured claim only for his deficiency, if any. This treatment also finds some support in
cases treating a bankrupt vendee's conditional sale contract as an executory contract which
the trustee can assume or reject. In re Forgee Metal Products, 229 F.2d 799 (3rd Cir. 1956);
In re Pagliaro, 99 F.Supp. 548 (N.D.Cal. 1951), aff'd sub non. Costello v. Golden, 196 F.2d
1017 (9th Cir. 1952); In re McCormick Lumber & Mfg. Corp., 144 F.Supp. 804 (D.Ore.
1956). My quarrel is not with the result reached, but with the terminology employed. I
would say that, rather than "rejecting" the contract, the trustee is abandoning burdensome
property. See 4 A. Collier, Bankruptcy 70.42 (14th rev. ed. 1967). And if he elected not
to abandon it, but to keep up the contract payments, I would not say that he was "assuming" the contract, but that he was exercising the debtor's right, which passed to him under
§ 70a, to complete performance and thus rid the property of the encumbrance. See note 11
and text at note 24, supra.
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ruptcy of the seller may not be subject to § 70b. But where he has
advanced only a part of that price before bankruptcy his contract
does seem to be executory under that section. At least that has been
the interpretation placed on § 70b in the case of a buyer of real
estate who has paid only a part of the price before his seller's bankruptcy. His contract has been held subject to rejection even though,
under the doctrine of equitable conversion, he has acquired equitable
title and, apart from bankruptcy, would be entitled to specific performance on tendering the balance of the purchase price.'
THE SELLER ON UNSECURED CREDIT

The other provision in Article 2 of the Code with which I am
concerned is § 2-702. That section deals with the converse of the
situation covered by § 2-502. The seller has delivered goods to the
buyer on unsecured credit 8 2 and then makes the unhappy discovery
that the buyer is insolvent. Here again, the seller could have protected himself by taking and properly perfecting a purchase money
security interest in the goods which would have prevailed even over a
prior perfected security interest covering after-acquired property.8 3
Here again, the function of the provision under consideration is to
give protection in the event of insolvency to a party who has not
taken the precaution of obtaining a security interest.
If the buyer was insolvent at the time he received the goods, the
seller may "reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days
after the receipt" by the buyer. But if a written misrepresentation of
solvency has been made to the particular seller within three months
before delivery the ten day limit does not apply. 8 4 The Comment to
this provision advises that it "takes as its base line the proposition
81. In re Philadelphia Penn Worsted Co., 278 F.2d 661 (3rd Cir. 1960); In re New York
Investors Mutual Group, 143 F.Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
82. U.C.C. § 2-702(2) applies only to the buyer who "has received goods on credit." The
rights of the seller on a cash sale who has taken a currently dated check which is later
dishonored are governed by other provisions of the Code. See supra note 63. But where "the
instrument offered by the buyer is not a payment but a credit instrument such as a note or a
check postdated by even one day, the seller's acceptance of the instrument insofar as third
parties are concerned, amounts to a delivery on credit and his remedies are set forth" in
U.C.C. § § 2-702, 2-511, Comment 6.
83. U.C.C. § 9-312(3), (4).
84. U.C.C. § 2-702(2). The seller's former remedies for fraud and for innocent misrepresentation may now be somewhat restricted by the Code, since § 2-702(2) also provides that,
"Except as provided in this subsection the seller may not base a right to reclaim goods on
the buyer's fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of insolvency or of intent to pay." Cf
U.C.C. § 2-721.
In addition, U.C.C. § 2-702(3) provides that, "Successful reclamation of the goods excludes all other remedies with respect to them," which apparently means that the seller who
reclaims the goods thereby forfeits any claim for a deficiency against the insolvent buyer.
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that any receipt of goods on credit by an insolvent buyer amounts to
a tacit business misrepresentation of solvency and therefore is
' '
Nothing in § 2-702
fraudulent as against the particular seller."
insolvent in
perpetually
relieves consumer buyers, many of whom are
8
at least one of the senses contemplated by the Code, 6 from the
'
operation of this "tacit business misrepresentation. "87
whose goods have
credit
This is a remedy given only to a seller on
is
not insolvent on
buyer
been received by an insolvent buyer. If the
to an actionconfined
receipt of the goods, the seller is apparently
8
8 For that
price.
the
or to an unsecured claim in bankruptcy-for
to me also
seems
§
2-702
under
right
reclamation
reason, the seller's
of
67c(1)(A)
64
and
§
§
under
subject to the arguments I have made
from
goods
recover
to
right
the Bankruptcy Act against the buyer's
an insolvent seller under § 2-502-it is a disguised priority.
True, the gloss supplied by the Comment about "tacit business
misrepresentation of solvency" which is "fraudulent" against the
seller is patently designed to bring the situation within prior cases
recognizing the right of a seller actually defrauded .torescind the sale
and recover the goods from the bankruptcy trustee of the buyer,
who takes no better title than the bankrupt under § 70a of the
Bankruptcy Act. 8 9
The question of the bankrupt's title under § 70a, like questions as
to the validity and amount of claims filed against the estate under
§ 63a,9' is to be determined by non-bankruptcy (usually state) law.
And non-bankruptcy doctrines allowing rescission for actual fraud are
applicable under both sections. Thus, a lender of money to the
bankrupt may rescind for fraud and defeat the bankrupt's title to the
funds lent if he can trace them.9 1 A seller of mineral rights may
likewise rescind for fraud and recover his properties from the bankruptcy trustee of his buyer.9 2 The trustee may defeat a claim filed
against the estate by establishing that it was acquired by fraud upon
85. U.C.C. § 2-702, Comment 2.
86. See supra note 5.
87. Other provisions of Article 2 of the Code distinguish between parties who are "merchants," as defined in U.C.C. § 2-104(1), and those who are not. See U.C.C. § § 2-201(2),
2-205, 2-207(2), 2-209(2), 2-314(1), 2-327(1)(c), 2-402(2), 2-509(3), 2-603(1), 2-605(1)(b)
and 2-609(2).
88. U.C.C. § § 2-607(1), 2-709(1). As a reading of those sections will reveal, this statement assumes that the buyer has not only "received" the goods, cf. U.C.C. § § 2-103(1)(c),
2-705, Comment 2, but has also "accepted" them. See U.C.C. § 2-606. But a buyer who
resists reclamation of the goods by the seller would necessarily accept them under
§ 2-606(1)(c) and Comment 4 thereto. And his power to accept would apparently pass to
his bankruptcy trustee under § 70a(3) of the Bankruptcy Act. 11 U.S.C. § l10a(3) (1964).
89. 11 U.S.C. § 110a (1964).
90. 11 U.S.C. § 103a (1964).
91. 11 U.S.C. § lla(21) (1964);see text at note 19, supra.
92. In re A. C. Kelley & Co., 6 F.Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
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the bankrupt.9 3 And one who was induced by fraud to buy stock in
a bankrupt corporation has been allowed to rescind and thus convert
his status from that of stockholder to that of creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding. 9 4
The same opportunity to rescind for actual fraud is,of course,
open to the defrauded seller of goods to a bankrupt buyer. The
substance of the fraud might relate to anything material to the
bargain, such as the identity of the buyer, 9" but most often it will
relate to the buyer's financial condition. In the simplest of cases, the
seller has been allowed to rescind and reclaim his goods from the
bankrupt estate, if he can identify them,9 6 by showing that the
buyer (1) made a materially false representation of his financial
condition, whether or not it represented him to be solvent when he
was in fact insolvent, (2) which he knew to be false, and (3) which
the seller relied upon in entering the contract of sale9 -and a few of
the cases have found the state law to permit recission even where the
buyer did not know the statement to be false, at least where he acted
98
in reckless disregard of the true facts or acted negligently.
An early Supreme Court decision 9 9 carried matters further in a
93. As with most self-evident propositions, it is difficult to find instances where the issue
was litigated. But the proposition was assumed in Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726 (1946),
where the trustee had previously litigated the fraud issue in a non-bankruptcy court and was
held bound by res judicata, and in Peeples v. Georgia Iron & Coal Co., 248 F. 886 (5th Cir.
1918), cert. denied, 247 U.S. 519 (1918), where the trustee was held not to have proved the
fraud alleged.
94. Davis v. Louisville Trust Co., 181 F. 10 (6th Cir. 1910); Cawthon v. Bancokentucky Co., 52 F.2d 850 (W.D.Ky. 1931). Cf.In re Watmough, 210 F. 539 (N.D. Ohio
1913).
95. See National Silver Co. v. Nicholas, 205 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1953), where the seller
failed to prove the fraud alleged.
96. In re Arkin Dress Co., Inc., 253 F. 926 (2d Cir. 1918).
97. O'Rieley v. Endicott-Johnson Corp., 297 F.2d (8th Cir. 1961); Manly v. Ohio Shoe
Co., 25 F.2d 384, 59 A.L.R. 413 (4th Cir. 1928); In re Weissman, 19 F.2d 769, 53 A.L.R.
644 (2d Cir. 1927);Inz re B. & R. Glove Corp., 279 F. 372 (2d Cir. 1922); William Openhym
& Sons v. Blake, 157 F. 536 (8th Cir. 1907); appeal dismissed sub nor. Blake
v. Openhym, 216 U.S. 322 (1910); In re Outdoor Clothing Co., 10 F.Supp. 617 (S.D.N.Y.
1935); In re Monson, 127 F.Supp. 625 (W.D.Ky. 1955); In re Flayton, 39 F.Supp. 774
(E.D.N.Y. 1941); In re Gold Band Curtain Co., 18 F.Supp. 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1937); In re
Indiana Concrete Pipe Co., 33 F.2d 594 (N.D. Ind. 1929); In re Perlestine, 19 F.2d 408
(W.D.Pa. 1927);In re Berg, 183 F. 885 (D. Mass. 1910);In re Bendall, 183 F. 816 (N.D.Ala.
1910); In re J. S. Patterson & Co., 125 F. 562 (N.D.Tex. 1903);In re Hamilton Furniture &
Carpet Co., 117 F. 774 (D.lnd. 1902).
A few cases allow the seller to rescind and reclaim his goods, not for fraud which induced
him to enter the contract of sale, but for fraud which induced him to deliver the goods
pursuant to the contract. California Conserving Co. v. D'Avanzo, 62 F.2d 528 (2d Cir.
1933); In re Pejepscot Paper Co., 22 F.Supp. 888 (D.Me. 1938); Mulroney Mfg. Co. v.
Weeks, 185 Iowa 714, 171 N.W. 36 (1919). Contra, In re Forsythe Shoe Corp., 3 F.Supp.
328 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
98. Sternberg v. American Snuff Co., 69 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1934); In re Gurvitz, 276
F. 931 (D. Mass. 1921). In re Underwood & Daniel, 215 F. 279 (N.D. Ga. 1914), seems
to go even further and to find the state law to allow recission by a seller who relied on a
false financial statement regardless of the buyer's culpability in making it.
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case where the buyer on credit made no express representations as to
his financial condition. But, when the seller later defended its right
to repossess the goods after the buyer's bankruptcy, the buyer's son,
who acted as his agent in making the purchase, obligingly testified
that he knew at the time of sale that his father was insolvent, that he
did not expect his father to pay for the goods and that his purpose in
purchasing them was to sell them and use the proceeds to prefer
some of his father's creditors. The seller also persuaded the court
that the buyer was "reputed to be solvent" and that the seller did
not learn of his insolvency until some time after the sale. There
apparently was no evidence to the contrary and the trial court instructed the jury that the buyer's assignee in bankruptcy under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1867 [who, like the trustee under the present
Act, took the title of the bankrupt as of the commencement of the
proceedings "by operation of law"] took only a defeasible title
which the seller could avoid by rescission. The inevitable verdict for
the seller was affirmed on the grounds that (1) "a party not intending to pay, who, as in this instance, induces the owner to sell him
goods on credit by fraudulently concealing his insolvency and his
intent not to pay for them, is guilty of a fraud which entitles the
vendor" to rescind and (2) the bankruptcy assignee has "no greater
interest in or better title to [the goods] than the bankrupt."
On the theory that a buyer on credit necessarily represents an
intention to pay upon which the seller necessarily relies, it requires
no stretching of traditional fraud concepts to hold that if the buyer
does not intend to pay at the time of making the representation the
seller should be able to rescind. Most of the later cases have so
construed the Supreme Court decision, holding that it is the buyer's
intent not to pay, and not the mere fact of his undisclosed insolvency at the time of the credit purchase, which entitles the seller
to rescind and recover the goods from the buyer's bankrupt estate. In
most of the cases where the reclaiming seller proves no more than the
buyer's failure to disclose his insolvency he has failed to recover the
goods, 1 0 0 even where the proof of insolvency is treated as creating a
rebuttable presumption of intent not to pay.' 0
99. Donaldson v. Farwell, 93 U.S. 631, 633-634 (1876).
100. United Construction Co. v. Milam, 124 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 642 (1942); Rochford v. New York Fruit Auction Corp., 116 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1940);
In re Independent Coal Corp., 18 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1927); In re Sherman, 13 F.2d 121 (2d
Cir. 1922); Hyman v. Trow Directory Printing & Bookbinding Co., 261 F. 991 (2d Cir.
1919); Schroth v. Monarch Fence Co., 229 F. 549 (6th Cir. 1916); In re New York Commercial Co., 228 F. 120 (2d Cir. 1915); In re Sol. Aarons & Co., 193 F. 646 (2d
Cir. 1912); In re Bentzel, 161 F.Supp. 219 (D.Md. 1958); In re Huffine & Clarke, Inc., 8
F.Supp. 753 (W.D.N.Y. 1934); In re General Lumber Products Co., 21 F.2d 979 (D.Md.
1927); In re Hunter-Rand Co., 241 F. 175 (E.D.N.C. 1917); John Heidsik Co. v. Rechter,
291 Mich. 708, 289 N.W. 304 (1939). See also In re Rader, 194 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1952).
101. In re Paper City Mill Supply Co., 28 F.2d 115 (D.Mass. 1928); Fisher v. Shreve,
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Where this view is followed the seller has in other cases carried his
additional burden of proving that the buyer did not intend to pay,

however. 1 0 2 And there is one case indorsing the proposition that the
seller need only prove that the insolvent debtor knew he could not
pay for the goods save by a payment which would be
preferential. 1 03
Section 2-702 would relieve the seller of all of these troublesome
details. Whenever he discovers that he has delivered goods on credit
to an insolvent buyer he may reclaim them, although the buyer made
no representations, was not aware of his insolvency and fully intended to pay. Indeed, as § 2-702 is written, it is apparently immaterial that the seller was fully aware of the buyer's insolvency

both at the time of the contract of sale and at the time of delivery of
the goods. True, the seller must make a demand for return of the
goods within ten days of their delivery, but this requirement disappears if within three months preceding delivery written "misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular seller"apparently without regard to whether the buyer knew or had reason

to know that the representation was false or whether the seller relied
on it. In the heroic words of Professor Lawrence King, § 2-702

"made no change; it carried over the fraud element but accepted its
existence as an irrebuttable presumption."' 04
The seller who invokes this provision in a state insolvency proceeding may be hard put to justify, under the equal protection

clause, the discriminatory treatment of those who loan money or
render services on credit to an insolvent. And if he invokes it in a
bankruptcy proceeding he will be hard put to distinguish In re

Trahan' 0 s in a way that will not be embarassing. That case dealt
Crump & Low Co., 7 F.2d 159 (D.Mass. 1925); In re Morrill-Mascott Co., 286 F. 449
(D.Mass. 1923);In re Berg, 183 F. 885 (D.Mass. 1910).
102. Sternberg v. American Snuff Co., 69 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1934); California Conserving Co. v. D'Avanzo, 62 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1933); Elbro Knitting Mills v. Schwartz, 30
F.2d 10 (6th Cir. 1929); In re Liebig, 255 F. 458 (2d Cir. 1918);In re K. Marks & Co., 218
F. 453 (2d Cir. 1914); Halsey v. Diamond Distilleries Co., 191 F. 498 (3rd Cir. 1911);
Gillespie v. J. C. Piles & Co., 178 F. 886 (8th Cir. 1910); In re Penn Table Co., 26
F.Supp. 887 (S.D.W.Va. 1939); In re Whitewater Lumber Co., 7 F.2d 410 (M.D.Ala. 1925);
In re P. H. Krauss & Co., 2 F.2d 999 (W.D.Tenn. 1924).
103. Manley Ohio Shoe Co., 25 F.2d 384. See also In re Henry Siegel Co., 223 F. 369
(D.Mass. 1915), rev'd 226 F. 1023 (lst Cir. 1915).
The seller who rescinds for alleged fraud and reclaims his goods before the buyer's
bankruptcy may, of course, have to prove the fraud as a defense to the bankruptcy trustee's
preference action. See Rochford v. New York Fruit Auction Co., 116 F.2d 584 (2d Cir.
1940); Fisher v.Shreve, Crump & Low Co., 7 F.2d 159 (D.Mass. 1955); Silvey & Co. v. Tift,
123 Ga. 804, 51 S.E. 748 (1905). He may also have to prove that he actually rescinded
before retaking the goods. Peoples Marketing Corp. v. Hackman, 347 F.2d 398 (7th Cir.
1965).
104. King, Reclamation Petition Granted:In Defense of The Defrauded Seller, 44 Ref. J.
81, 82 (1970).
105. In re Trahan 283 F.Supp. 620 (W.D.La. 1968), affd 402 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 930 (1969).
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with Louisiana's statutory "vendor's privilege," which entitles the
unpaid seller of goods to seize or sequester the property sold as long
as it remains in the possession of the buyer. The privilege was held to
be a statutory lien, but one which did not fall within § 67c(l)(A)
only because it was effective whether or not the buyer was insolvent.
If the rubric in the Comment about "tacit business misrepresentation" will save this provision under § 64a and § 67c(l)(A)
of the Bankruptcy Act, the draftsmen may have overlooked a bet.
Perhaps they should have also drafted a Comment to § 2-502 along
these lines: "This section takes as its base line the proposition that
any receipt of payment on the price by a seller of goods who becomes insolvent within ten days thereafter amounts to a tacit business misrepresentation of his financial condition at the time payment
is received."
But there are other problems with § 2-702. As originally adopted
in most states, it provides that the seller's reclamation right "is subject to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith
purchaser or lien creditor under this Article (Section 2-403)." So far
as lien creditors are concerned, this is an inscrutable provision.
Article 2 nowhere defines the rights of lien creditors. The express
reference to § 2-403 leads only to a statement that, "The
rights ... of lien creditors are governed by the Articles on Secured
Transactions (Article 9), Bulk Transfers (Article 6) and Documents
of Title (Article 7)." While those Articles tell us something about the
rights of lien creditors against unperfected security interests,' 0 6
goods sold on bulk transfer" 7 and goods covered by negotiable
documents' 8 -if we apply to all three Articles the definition provided for Article 9' 0 '-they tell us nothing about the rights of lien
creditors against sellers seeking to reclaim goods under § 2-702.
In re Kravitz,' 1 0 confronting this conundrum in a case where the
seller sought to reclaim the goods from the bankrupt estate of the
buyer, effected a two step solution. First, it read the reference to a
"lien creditor" in § 2-702 to mean the sort of lien creditor defined
in Article 9, whose status the bankruptcy trustee acquires under
§ 70c of the Bankruptcy Act. Second, it looked to state preCode law
106. U.C.C. § 9-301.
107. Although it takes an assist from Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 6-104 to make Article 6
deal with lien creditors. See also U.C.C. § 6-111.
108. U.C.C. § 7-602.
109. "A 'lien creditor' means a creditor who has acquired a lien on the property involved
by attachment, levy or the like and includes an assignee for the benefit of creditors from the
time of assignment, and a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of filing of the petition or a
receiver in equity from the time of appointment... " U.C.C. § 9-301(3).
110. In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960).
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to find that the rescission right of a seller defrauded in fact was
subject to the levy of a creditor who had extended credit subsequent
to the sale, concluded that the same rule should apply under that
state's version of § 2-702, and allowed the trustee to defeat the
reclamation under § 70c. In a later case arising in another state the
court followed the same course until it found that by preCode law in
that state the right of a defrauded seller to rescind was superior to
the rights of any levying creditor. It therefore allowed the seller to
reclaim the goods from the buyer's bankrupt estate.' ' ' If, as reported, the preCode law of most states allowed a defrauded seller to
prevail over a levying creditor,' 11 2 this approach will mean that the
bankruptcy trustee's rights under § 70c will seldom be available
against the reclaiming seller under § 2-702.
But this approach does not seem to me unassailable. Since neither
§ 2-403 nor any other provision of Article 2 defines a lien creditor
or his rights, it is possible to give a different reading to § 2-702.
Where it provides that the seller's right of reclamation is "subject to
the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser
or lien creditor under this Article (Section 2-403)" it is possible to
read the words "under this Article (Section 2-403)" as qualifying
only the rights of buyers in ordinary course or other good faith
purchasers-whose rights are dealt with in § 2-403.' '3 As to lien
creditors, the provision would then simply say that the seller's right
of reclamation is "subject to the rights of ... a lien creditor," which
could without strain be read to mean is "subject to the lien of a lien
creditor." This interpretation would still leave it to the court to
determine whether "lien creditor" means the sort of levying creditor
whose hypothetical status the bankruptcy trustee acquires under
§ 70c, and here the definition provided for Article 9' '4 provides a
persuasive analogy. But if the court resolved that question in favor of
the trustee, no resort to preCode law would be necessary to conclude
that the goods should remain in the bankrupt estate.
Of course, the vulnerability of the seller's reclamation rights to the
rights of a levying creditor would not avail the bankruptcy trustee of
111. In re Mel Golde Shoes, Inc., 403 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1968).
112. 4 A. Collier, Bankruptcy 485 (14th rev. ed. 1967); Note, Bankruptcy and Article
Two of the Uniform Commercial Code: The Right To Recover The Goods Upon Insolvency,
79 Harv. L. Rev. 598, 610 (1966); Note, Selected PriorityProblems In Secured Financing
Under The Uniform Commercial Code, 68 Yale L. J. 751, 758 (1959).
113. Legislative history supports this reading. In the 1950 version of § 2-702 the seller's
reclamation right was "subject to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good
faith purchaser under this Article (Section 2-403)." The references to a "lien creditor" were
inserted in both § 2-702 and § 2-403(4) thereafter, Braucher, Reclamation of Goods from a
FraudulentBuyer, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 1281, 1286-1287 (1967).
114. See supra note 109.
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the buyer if the seller had recovered the goods before bankruptcy. In
that event, the trustee would have to argue that the seller's rights
under § 2-702 of the Code were invalid under § 64a or § 67c(1)(A)
of the Bankruptcy Act-or voidable under § 70e of that Act for
reasons developed below-and then attack the seller's recovery of the
goods as a preferential transfer under § 60.
For a time, the Code draftsmen seemed to acquiesce in the Kravitz
decision. In the 1962 official version of the Code, Comment 3 to
§ 2-702 was amended to explain that "lien creditor" in that section
had the "same meaning" as in Article 9, and that lien creditors might
have rights "not arising under this Article" as in Kravitz. But a
number of states, including California, Illinois, New Jersey, New
Mexico and New York, dealt with the problem by deleting the reference to "lien creditor" in § 2-702 and the Permanent Editorial
Board for the Code now endorses that solution.' '
I am far from convinced that this is a solution so far as the rights
of the bankruptcy trustee of the buyer are concerned. There will in
many cases be another character on the scene-a creditor with a Code
security interest. Even though his security agreement antedates the
sale which the seller now seeks to undo, it would not be surprising if
his agreement contained an after acquired property clause. Such a
secured party is also, under the Code, a "purchaser."' '16 The seller's
reclamation right under § 2-702 is still subject to the rights of a
"good faith purchaser under this Article (Section 2-403)." Under
§ 2-403(1), "A person with voidable title has power to transfer a
good title to a good faith purchaser for value."' ' Certainly the
insolvent buyer who can keep the goods unless the seller demands
their return within ten days of their receipt has a "voidable
title." 1s Hence, one bankruptcy referee has already concluded that
the holder of a security interest with an after acquired property
clause will prevail over a subsequent seller's right to reclaim under
§ 2-702.119
115. Report no. 3 of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code 3
(1967).

116. U.C.C. § 1-201(32), (33).
117. "Good faith" means "honesty in fact." U.C.C. § 1-201(19). "Value" is given when
a security interest is taken for antecedent debt. U.C.C. § 1-201(44). The seller's reclamation
right is also subject to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course of business. If the buyer is a
merchant dealing in goods of the kind delivered to him, the seller would lose his right to
reclaim on a resale to a buyer in ordinary course under U.C.C. § 2-403(2), (3).
118. See text at notes 62-63, supra.
119. In re [hereinafter cited as Hayward] Hayward Woolen Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. 1107
(Ref.D.Mass. 1967). My colleague, Professor Robert Braucher, advises me that on a true
reading of U.C.C. § 2-403(1) an "unconscious purchaser" is not a "good faith purchaser for
value" so that a secured party whose security agreement with the buyer antedates the

July 1971]

BUYERS AND SELLERS OF GOODS IN BANKRUPTCY

459

But the secured creditor who is a purchaser under § 2-403 of the
Code is still a creditor with a provable claim in any bankruptcy
proceeding of the buyer. If, as I have previously argued,' ° the
bankruptcy trustee can invoke his rights under § 70e of the Bankruptcy Act, he can defeat the seller's reclamation right under
§ 2-702 of the Code.'21
CONCLUSION

I have attempted to demonstrate that, in § 2-502 and § 2-702 of
the Code, the draftsmen have taken unwarranted liberties with the
provisions and policies of the Bankruptcy Act. I have earlier made a
similar criticism of certain provisions of Article 9 of the Code.' 2 2
The earlier effort has provoked from one of the Code's proponents
the observation that I apparently view Article 9 as "the work of the
devil" and from another that I have insulted the memory of Karl
Llewellyn. While I consider both of these observations inaccurate, I
do believe the draftsmen tended too much to regard the people with
whose problems they were concerned as constituents who were
entitled to the full measure of the draftsmen's considerable talents to
forge protection against the vicissitudes of bankruptcy-even where
that meant protecting one constituent from the bankruptcy of
another. Perhaps if the Code had included additional Articles dealing
with the rights of unsecured creditors other than unsecured buyers
and sellers of goods and with the rights of debtors, all of the usual
cast of characters in a bankruptcy proceeding would have received
even-handed treatment under the Code. But there would still remain
questions of the extent to which the Code can change the content of
the Bankruptcy Act.
seller's reclamation right could not rely solely on his after acquired property clause to defeat
the seller's right, but must show that he made an additional advance in reliance on the
buyer's possession of the goods. In the Hayward case the goods had been delivered to the
buyer on December 6, 7 and 9 and the secured party had made an additional advance on
December 7. Nothing was shown as to the secured party's reliance on, or even awareness of,
such goods as were in the possession of the buyer at the time of the advance. The court
concluded that, since the secured party had no notice of the buyer's insolvency, it was a
bona fide purchaser for value under § 2-403(1) both because its pre-existing claim constituted value under § 1-201(44) and because its December 7 advance was "roughly contemporaneous" with the deliveries. The buyer's bankruptcy trustee did not attempt to
invoke § 70e, and the secured party was held entitled to the goods as against the reclaiming
sellers.
120. See text at notes 65-76, supra.
121. King, supra note 104, ignores this possibility. But he goes at least as far as Professor
Kennedy, supra note 73, in arguing that the bankruptcy trustee cannot invoke the rights of
a secured creditor under § 70e of the Bankruptcy Act.
122. Supra note 36.

